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Global diffusion, policy flexibility, and inflation targeting
Fabio Wasserfallen
Zeppelin University
ABSTRACT
A diverse group of over 30 countries located all over the world
—such as the UK, Colombia, and Ghana—introduced inflation
targeting, which is a monetary policy that seeks to control
inflation through a pre-announced target. Fully institutiona-
lized democracies adopted the policy first because the core
features of inflation targeting are consistent with the principles
of a liberal democracy. But why was inflation targeting also
introduced by less-democratic countries? This article develops
the argument that decision makers of less-democratic coun-
tries became more likely to adopt inflation targeting when
they observed that nearby countries increased the flexibility
of the policy. The statistical analysis of data from 76 countries
between 1989 and 2013 supports this hypothesis. The finding
that the change of a policy toward a more flexible framework
drives its global spread addresses a blind spot in the more
recent policy diffusion literature.
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The seminal contribution by Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) starts with
the observation that a large set of policies have spread globally, such as the
protection of women’s rights, competition laws, and environmental standards.
Following this work, an abundant literature has generated various insights on
how policies spread, particularly in the field of international political economy
with the study of the spread of liberal economic ideas and policies, global and
regional interconnectedness, and the interaction between international forces
and domestic actors (Cao 2012; Chaudoin, Milner, and Pang 2015; Simmons
and Elkins 2004). One fundamental question of global diffusion, however,
remains largely unexplored—namely, why a policy spreads to a very hetero-
genous group of countries, which are all confronted with distinct political and
economic challenges. To shed light on this question, this study explores why and
how policies are adopted by countries all over the world.
Conceptually, this article divides global diffusion in different stages. In the first
stage, countries with a regime type that is conducive to a policy adopt. Global
diffusion, however, implies that a policy is also introduced by countries that have
institutions that are less compatible with the original framework of a policy. The
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literature on the emulation mechanism of diffusion argues that a policy becomes
attractive for countries that have institutions that are less compatible with a policy,
when the policy has established a reputation as a best practice (see, for example,
Bearce and Bondanella 2007). Following Meyer and Rowan (1977), historical and
sociological research further shows that decision makers of such countries adjust
policies to more flexible frameworks. Building on this research, this article iden-
tifies the increased flexibility of a policy as the key driver of global diffusion. The
main argument hypothesizes that the change of a policy to a more flexible
framework by one country increases the likelihood of further adoptions by other
countries, whose existing institutions are also less compatible with the policy.
The theoretical arguments on step-wise global diffusion are empirically eval-
uated in a study on the global spread of inflation targeting (IT). In 1990, New
Zealand introduced IT, which is a monetary policy framework that focuses on the
management of inflation expectations. By 2010, a highly heterogenous group of
countries—including the UK, Armenia, Ghana, Peru, and Thailand—has adopted
IT. This global spread of IT has been “almost completely ignored by political
scientists”(Singer and Mukherjee 2008: 324).1 Fully institutionalized democracies
provide a conducive institutional setting for IT because the key features of IT, such
as separation of powers, transparency, and accountability, are reflections of the
core principles of liberal democracies (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997; Broz 2002).
Thus, fully institutionalized democracies are expected to adopt IT early in the
global diffusion process. The empirical investigation of data from 76 countries
between 1989 and 2013 supports the hypotheses that fully institutionalized
democracies are more likely to adopt IT, and that this effect is particularly strong
in the first stage of diffusion.
The main hypothesis of this article on the global diffusion of IT expects that
decision makers of less-democratic countries become more likely to introduce IT,
when nearby countries increase the flexibility of the policy. The literature discusses
a 2% target as optimal (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen 1999). Yet,
Armenia, for example, adopted an inflation target of 3.5%–6.5% because the
institutional setting of Armenia is not consistent with IT, as the president has
maintained extensive powers that are only very weakly checked. The key explana-
tion for Armenia’s adoption is that its neighbor, Turkey, used, in the years before
Armenia’s adoption, very flexible IT frameworks with targets of 6%–8% and 3%–
7%. The statistical analyses of spatial lag models support the argument that
increased policy flexibility in nearby countries increased the likelihood of IT
adoption in less-democratic countries.
This analysis builds on and advances the literature on policy diffusion and the
scholarships on the interactions between domestic and international politics,
monetary policy, and decoupling (Chaudoin et al. 2015; Dobbin et al. 2007;
1In contrast, the worldwide spread of central bank independence has been rather well studied (Bodea et al. 2015;
McNamara 2002; Polillo et al. 2005).
618 F. WASSERFALLEN
Meyer and Rowan 1977). The main contribution of the article is the conceptua-
lization of global diffusion in different stages and, most importantly, the theore-
tical and empirical study of how the changing characteristics of IT drives its
adoption by distinct regimes all over the world. The finding that the change of
a policy is a key driver of diffusion addresses a blind spot in the more recent
diffusion literature, which assumes that policies do not change as they spread.
Overall, a large body of the policy diffusion literature suggests that diffusion
leads to homogenous policies, neglecting that policies are adapted to local
contexts.
Global Diffusion, Regime Type, and Policy Flexibility
The core question addressed by diffusion scholars is why and how policymakers
react to prior policy choices of other countries (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett
2008). Policymakers may, for example, adopt a policy because of its normative
constructed properties as appropriate practice or because they observe that
a policy is successful elsewhere (Shipan and Volden 2008). Although the diffu-
sion literature offers a wide variety of theoretical explanations, the conventional
approach is to prioritize one single diffusion mechanism. This assumption is
particularly problematic for the global spread of a policy, whereby a very hetero-
genous set of countries introduces the same policy. It is unlikely that the same
motivation explains policy adoptions by very different countries.
In addition, diffusion scholars typically ignore the specific (and changing)
content of a policy, assuming that all adoptions are essentially equivalent.
Several analyses address this over-simplification by showing that the frame-
work of a policy is “reframed, reinterpreted, and modified” throughout the
diffusion process (Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014: 271). Some qualitative,
historical, and sociological studies analyze how policies change in diffusion
processes (Beissinger 2007; Chorev 2012; Howlett and Morgan 2011; Radaelli
2005). Surprisingly, little research, however, has studied whether and, if so,
how the varying and changing characteristics of a policy itself shapes the
diffusion process. A notable exception is the study by Brooks (2007), who
develops the argument that specific policy features of pension reforms
mediate diffusion (see also Genovese, Kern, and Martin 2017).
This article goes beyond the narrow focus of the diffusion literature that
analyzes only one mechanism and assumes that the content of a policy does not
change while it spreads. The theoretical argument developed by this article
distinguishes between more and less likely adopters of a policy based on their
regime types. For the purpose of this analysis, global diffusion is not defined as
universal coverage, in the sense that a very large number of countries have
adopted a policy. Rather, the term global refers to a spatial coverage that spans all
over the world, which means that a very heterogenous group of countries
introduced a policy (not necessarily a high share of all countries).
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The most likely adopters of a policy are countries with economic, political,
and institutional features that are consistent with the framework of a policy.
Several studies analyze how the fit of a policy with a specific context shapes
diffusion patterns, whereas context is broadly conceptualized with references to
economic and political conditions, institutions, or the professionalisms of
administrations (Bernauer, Kalbhenn, Vally, and Spilker 2010; Brooks and
Kurtz 2012; Neumayer and Thomas 2012; Shipan and Volden 2014). As far as
the pattern of adoption is concerned, we should expect that countries with
a regime type that is consistent with the general idea of a policy are more likely
to adopt in the early stage of diffusion. This argument on institutional fit predicts
spatially constrained diffusion within the geographic region where these insti-
tutionally similar countries are located. The defining feature of global diffusion,
however, is adoption by countries all over the world—including countries with
regimes that are less consistent with the policy. Thus, the key for explaining
global diffusion is to understand why a policy is also adopted by countries with
a regime type that is less consistent with the design of a policy.
Early adopters contribute to the global spread of a policy to the extent to which
their adoptions help establishing the reputation of a policy as best practice. The
diffusion literature on emulation theorizes how policies are socially constructed as
appropriate norms and adopted because policymakers aim to conform to these
established norms (Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Dobbin et al. 2007). The advo-
cacy and promotion of a policy as genuine best practice by international organiza-
tions, experts, and powerful countries transforms a policy from innovation to the
status of appropriateness. Establishing the reputation of a policy as best practice is
a necessary condition for global diffusion and disconnects the policy from the
specific regime type, in which the policy was developed.
When a policy has a reputation as a best practice, governments gain interna-
tional credibility by introducing it. At this stage, policymakers of countries with
less-conducive regime types also have the incentive to introduce the policy, not
least because adoption signals to the international community compliance with
the newly established norm. The decoupling research byMeyer and Rowan (1977)
argues that decision makers adopt a policy that is considered to be state-of-the-art
to gain external legitimacy and that the practice of the policy is adapted to specific
contexts. Such policy adjustments usually mean an increase of the flexibility of
a policy (Wiener 2007; Winston 2018). Following this strand of research, Chorev
(2012: 834) provides a detailed analysis of how some countries decouple the
practice of a policy from its original version “by broadening the range of flex-
ibilities.” As is common in this literature, Chorev (2012) studies domestic resis-
tance to parts of a policy. This is an important and interesting question, but not the
focus of this analysis, which conceptualizes the increased flexibility of a policy as
a force of further diffusion.
This article thus builds on and departs from the decoupling scholarship by
investigating whether the change of a policy framework by one country also
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affects the probability of further adoptions by other countries. The main
argument of this article is that the example of a policy change in one country
increases the likelihood of adoptions by other countries that (also) have
regime types that are not conducive to the original version of the policy. In
this dynamic, the change of a policy towards a more flexible framework
becomes itself the driver of diffusion and takes the policy beyond a set of
homogenous countries. This process explains how the increased flexibility of
a policy paves the way for its global spread and theorizes the complex
interaction between domestic and international politics by specifying how
regime types moderate global diffusion (Chaudoin et al. 2015).
Taken together, the arguments developed above explain the different stages of
global diffusion as follows: countries with a regime type that is conducive to
a policy adopt first. Then, the advocacy for a policy by experts and international
organizations establishes, following the emulation mechanism, the reputation of
a policy as a best practice. This makes the policy attractive also for countries with
less conducive regime types, which is a necessary condition for global diffusion.
Finally, countries with less conducive regime types become more likely to adopt
when they observe that other countries have increased the flexibility of a policy.
This final step explains why and how a policy spreads beyond a set of homo-
genous countries. The following sections analyze these theoretical arguments for
the case of IT.
Arguments on the Global Diffusion of Inflation Targeting
Key, as far as the contextual backdrop of IT is concerned, is the fundamental
change in monetary economics that started in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
when leading economists reached a consensus on the main principles of
central banking. The bottom line of this monetary consensus is that inde-
pendent central banks should focus on providing low and stable inflation
(Bernanke et al. 1999). The theory on the time inconsistency problem lays the
intellectual foundation for this argument (Calvo 1978; Woodford 2003). The
implication of the time inconsistency problem is that only an independent
central bank that prioritizes the control of inflation over other macroeco-
nomic goals can provide successful monetary policymaking. The most
straightforward example of a political intervention damaging the effective-
ness of IT is an incumbent government that seeks to influence monetary
policymaking to win reelection.
At the same time as this intellectual consensus in monetary economics
emerged, the labor government in New Zealand put together a larger reform
agenda, including a change of monetary policy to a framework that later
became known as IT. The New Zealand version of IT was direct and clear:
low and stable inflation was acknowledged as the primary goal of monetary
policy. As such, the government announced a low inflation target range with
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a one-year time horizon.2 The government could even dismiss the Governor
of the Reserve Bank in the event that the inflation target was not met. In
essence, the IT framework makes the central bank accountable to the govern-
ment and the public for delivering inflation within the target range. Major
innovations of IT are the precise mandate and the accountability of the
framework.
A few years after the introduction of IT in New Zealand in 1990, promi-
nent academics embraced the new monetary policy as a practical framework
that addressed the aforementioned time inconsistency problem. Economists
advocated IT as the new state-of-the-art monetary policy and the IMF started
to promote IT all over the world through conferences, research, and technical
assistance (Batini, Breuer, Kochhar, and Roger 2006). The congruence
between the dominant academic thinking and the features of IT led to
widespread advocacy on its behalf. In addition, the subsequent adoptions
of IT further strengthened its reputation. Reichlin and Baldwin (2013: 13)
concluded that “[f]rom the late 1980s, independent central banks with infla-
tion targets became the thinking’s person solution.”
Among others, McNamara (1999) and King (2005) analyze how experts
and specialists developed, within international epistemic communities,
shared ideas and new paradigms, legitimizing and promoting central bank
independence and IT. Thomassen (2017) argues, in a detailed case study, that
the Norwegian IT adoption is explained by the ideational advocacy by
experts for IT “as the best means” to secure price stability (Thomassen
2017: 843). He traces in detail how IT “came to hold prestige in the central
bankers’ epistemic community” (Thomassen 2017: 852), listing several influ-
ential central bankers and academics that interacted as advocates for IT in
“formal and informal networks” (Thomassen 2017: 841). Several studies on
epistemic communities, central banking, and ideational power document the
buildup of a widely shared consensus that IT is best practice, which facili-
tated the spread of IT, as the emulation mechanism of diffusion suggests
(Bearce and Bondanella 2007; King 2005; McNamara 1999). However, this
mechanism does not explain the pattern of adoption.
Adoptions Because of Institutional Fit
A key factor of (early) policy adoption is the fit of a policy with existing institu-
tions. The more a new policy is consistent with existing institutions and norms,
the more likely a country is to introduce it. To identify the “most likely” early
adopters, we thus need to specify what type of institutional setting fits with the
framework of a new policy. In a seminal article, Broz (2002) shows that monetary
policy choices depend on the extent to which a political system is democratic. His
2After a few reductions, the target was set in 1995 at 1% with a range between 0% and 2%.
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analysis focuses on central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs. As far as
the latter is concerned, Broz (2002) argues that less-democratic and less-developed
states are more likely to adopt exchange-rate pegs because trust in the monetary
system is imported from the anchor currency. In other words, the exchange-rate
peg substitutes for the democratic deficits.
In the case of central bank independence, he reverses the argument: the political
regime—not the monetary policy framework—provides transparency and
accountability. Here, the democratic functions of the political system act as
a necessary complement that makes the “opaque commitment” of central bank
independence “credible” (Broz 2002: 868). IT is similar to central bank indepen-
dence in this respect. The IT framework is credible and effective when the central
bank can execute its mandate in an environment that fully protects its operational
freedomwith the democratic safeguard of separation of power. Aside from that, IT
is connected to further dimensions of democratic governance. The democratic
principles of transparency and accountability are also among the most frequently
mentioned arguments for IT (Bernanke et al. 1997; Svensson 2010). Thomassen
(Thomassen 2017: 850), for example, points out that a key element of IT is tomake
a central bank “more accountable and transparent” to the public and the govern-
ment (emphasis in the original). Therefore, the ideational advocacy for IT is linked
to several dimensions of a liberal democracy and goes well beyond the separation
of powers and the time inconsistency problem.
In sum, a democratic regime provides the institutional and ideational
context for IT. The key elements of IT are consistent with the model of
a liberal democracy because (a) the incumbent government is not in
a position to skew elections in its favor through activist monetary policy;
(b) the broader society is addressed with predictable policy decisions; and (c)
regulatory, monetary, and economic policymaking are assigned to different
institutions that control each other. This means that the argument on
institutional fit predicts that IT adoptions are more likely in fully institutio-
nalized democracies, particularly in the early stage of diffusion. Accordingly,
the first two hypotheses on the spread of IT are that
IT adoption is more likely, the more institutionalized a democracy is (H1); while this
effect is particularly strong for early adopters and thus decreases over time (H2).
Global Spread of IT Because of Policy Flexibility
As more and more countries adopt IT, the policy establishes its reputation as an
appropriate policy option. The strong backing by an epistemic community of
central bankers, academics, and the IMF further strengthens the standing of IT
as a best practice, which creates a strong incentive for adoption and strengthens
domestic actors that seek to prioritize inflation control (King 2005; McNamara
1999; Thomassen 2017). The IMF advocated IT also for developing countries,
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offering technical assistance and arguing that IT can also be successfully adopted
when not all institutional prerequisites are met (Batini et al. 2006; Batini and
Laxton 2007; Singer and Mukherjee 2008).
The question of whether a central bank should prioritize inflation control has
distributional consequences and, as such, divides groups within countries. The
specific political conflicts are context dependent, but the general expectation is
that right parties, wealthier citizens, and the financial sector prioritize inflation
control in monetary policymaking; while left parties, citizens that are more
exposed to labormarket risks, and large parts of the export-industry, particularly
the less specialized producers of simple manufactures, prefer a stable and
competitive (that is, slightly undervalued) currency (Broz and Frieden 2006;
Scheve 2004; Singer and Mukherjee 2008). In short, setting the priority of
monetary policymaking depends on the economic profile of a country and the
political strength of different interests in a society.
In terms of the economic profile, less developed countries are confronted
with higher macroeconomic instability, volatility in capital flows, fragile
institutions, and higher exposure to external shocks, which all increase the
costs and risks of IT adoptions. Several economists argue that less developed
countries that are not fully institutionalized democracies do not meet the
institutional prerequisites for IT and that they should focus on reducing
exchange rate volatility and the control of capital flows, not inflation
(Eichengreen, Masson, Savaston, and Sharma 1999; Epstein and Yeldan
2009; Filardo and Gensberg 2010). Notwithstanding this criticism, the IMF
and prominent academics have promoted IT also for not fully institutiona-
lized democracies, which has strengthened political actors that seek to prior-
itize inflation control and has contributed to the building up of IT as an
appropriate, state-of-the-art policy. The introduction of IT signals adherence
to this newly established norm, which may also attract foreign investment.
Thus, despite the criticism that IT may not be an ideal option for less
developed countries that are not fully institutionalized democracies, policy-
makers of these countries have multiple incentives to adopt IT.
At the same time, policymakers of less developed countries can constrain the
potential negative consequences of adoption. This can be achieved by adopting
a flexible version of the policy. Even the critics of IT concede that an attractive
feature of IT is its flexibility (Fraga, Goldfain, and Minella 2003). The main
operational constraints are the inflation target and the range of the target. In the
original version, the inflation target is set at 2%, and, if there is a range at all, it is
very narrow (±1%). The most straightforward way to adjust IT to a more flexible
framework is to increase the target and range. A good proxy for the flexibility of
IT is thus the sum of the point target and the range: the higher the target and
range, the higher the flexibility of the IT framework.
Two straightforward implications follow from the arguments developed so
far. First, less-developed and less-democratic countries should adopt more
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flexible versions of IT, and the average flexibility of all adopted IT frame-
works should increase over time, as more countries introduce IT. The
descriptive investigation of the data supports these empirical implications.
The flexibility of IT is substantially larger for less-democratic countries
compared to fully institutionalized democracies and increases, as the policy
diffuses globally (see Appendix A2 for the empirics on this). This descriptive
analysis already supports the arguments that countries with an institutional
misfit increase the flexibility of a policy and that they adopt later. The key
question derived from the theoretical argument developed above, however, is
whether increasing the flexibility of IT also affects the probability of further
adoptions by other countries that are (also) less democratic.
Spatial proximity is a good proxy for the availability of policy information
because policymakers are more familiar with the details of policy frameworks
of nearby countries. The basic assumption here is that policymakers are more
likely to be aware of fine-grained policy changes in countries that are
geographically close because of more exchange among experts and greater
media coverage. Policymakers are more informed about detailed policy
changes of frameworks that have already been introduced in nearby countries
(not the adoption itself, which will be widely noticed). As policymakers of
nearby countries take notice of these changes, they become more likely to
adopt IT if they govern less-democratic countries. Accordingly, the main
hypothesis (H3) of this article is that
less-democratic countries become more likely to adopt IT when nearby countries
change IT to a more flexible framework by increasing targets and ranges (H3).
Data and Empirical Model
The data for the empirical analysis starts in 1989, a year before the first IT
introduction, and ends, for data availability reasons, in 2013. The analysis
includes all countries that are minimally democratic and for which data on
standard legal central bank independence is available (Cukierman, Webb,
and Neyapti 1992). I consider countries to be minimally democratic when
they are not under foreign occupation and have an average positive polity
score over the investigated time period (see, for example, Besley and Reynal-
Querol 2011).3 Applying these selection criteria, I end up with 76 countries in
the data set of which 30 have adopted IT. Following standard modeling
practice that builds on event history analysis, I analyze time-series cross-
section logit models predicting the probability of IT adoption. To account for
the event history structure of the data, all country-year observations are
dropped from the sample after a country adopts IT because the country is
3Source: Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800–2013, Monty G. Marshall et al.,
Center for Systemic Peace.
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no longer at risk of introducing the policy. Also, the models include t, t2, and
t3 to control for time dependence (Bernauer et al. 2010; Carter and Signorino
2010). The following describes the coding of the main variables (see
Appendix A1 for more information).
Dependent Variable
I code, as dependent variable, the formal adoption of IT—that is, a central bank
officially declares that it is introducing IT as its monetary policy framework. For
the coding of IT adoptions, I relied on monetary policy and inflation reports of
central banks and double-checked these primary sources with IMF working
papers and additional secondary literature.4 Figure 1 plots the 30 IT adoptions
under investigation. The pattern of IT adoptions lends support for the hypoth-
esis that fully institutionalized democracies are likely to introduce IT early in
the diffusion process. From 1991 to 1995, a rather homogeneous group of
liberal market economies with highly institutionalized democratic regimes
followed the example of the first adopter, New Zealand. The global spread of
IT started in 1997, and it particularly took off in 1999, with its first introduc-
tions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
The (Diminishing) Effect of Democracy
To evaluate hypothesis H1 that IT adoption is more likely the more institu-
tionalized a democracy is, I model the polity score as a predictor of IT
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Figure 1. IT adoptions from 1990 to 2013.
4All primary and secondary sources are available upon request.
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adoption. The polity score is a fairly aggregate variable, consisting of mea-
sures quantifying most relevant institutional dimensions that are consistent
with IT, such as the separation of powers, accountability, and transparency.
To analyze the time dependence of the effect of democratic institutions on IT
adoption (H2), I interact the polity score with time t.
IT Flexibility in Nearby Countries
To analyze the main hypothesis H3 of this article—that less-democratic countries
become more likely to adopt IT when nearby countries change the IT framework
by increasing targets and ranges—I estimate a measure of the flexibility of the IT
framework. The flexibility of IT is calculated as the sum of the point target and
the range, which is a straightforward estimate of both the room for maneuver of
monetary policymakers and of the extent to which the policy framework has
changed (as compared to the original version adopted in New Zealand). The IT
flexibility index codes all frameworks in operation on a yearly basis (not only in
the adoption years). Thus, the index values change with every increase or
decrease of the target or the range (see Appendix A5 for an alternative specifica-
tion). To empirically evaluate whether policymakers become more likely to adopt
IT when they observe that nearby countries increase the flexibility of their IT
policies (H3), I multiply the IT flexibility index with a row-standardized spatial
distance connectivity matrix, using the inverse of the geographic distance
between capitals.5 In short, the IT flexibility spatial lag gets higher values, the
more a nearby country increases its IT target and range.
In principle, this variable is similar to a conventional spatial lag used in the
diffusion literature. The only—yet important—difference is that the spatial
connectivity matrix is not multiplied with the dependent variable (that is, the
adoptions of IT), but with the flexibility of IT. Therefore, I do not investigate
whether policymakers are responsive to IT adoptions in nearby countries.
Rather, I empirically evaluate whether policymakers are more likely to
introduce IT when nearby countries change their IT policy to a more flexible
framework. To empirically test whether this effect is mediated by the regime
type (see H3), I interact the IT flexibility spatial lag with the polity score and
expect a positive coefficient of the IT flexibility spatial lag for not fully
institutionalized democracies.
Exchange-Rate Regime
The choice of a monetary policy framework is inherently a trade-off decision.
According to theMundellian trilemma, a country cannot, under the condition of
5The spatial distance data come from the R package cshapes. Appendix A5 reports the empirical analysis with only
the range.
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free international capital mobility, simultaneously fix the exchange rate and
conduct autonomous monetary policymaking that is targeted at domestic
goals such as inflation control. The Mundellian trilemma suggests that, in the
international monetary system of free capital flows, central banks can either peg
the exchange rate to an anchor currency or target domestic macroeconomic
indicators. Pegging the exchange rate provides, under certain conditions, mone-
tary credibility, and stability. However, pegs can come under attack from
investors. The main alternative for an exchange-rate peg is IT. Therefore, the
presence or enactment of a freely floating exchange-rate regime should increase
the likelihood of IT adoption. To investigate whether the adoption of IT depends
on the presence or enactment of a freely floating exchange-rate regime, I use
a standard exchange-rate classification index, which codes the extent to which
a currency is freely floating or pegged to another currency.6
Control Variables
The statistical analysis controls for a set of variables. As institutional vari-
ables, I use measures of central bank independence and the political system.
One might expect that IT adoption is more likely, the more a country grants
independence to its central bank. However, the institutional independence of
a central bank may also substitute for IT because institutional independence
already addresses the time inconsistency problem. Appendix A3 further
discusses the relationship between IT and central bank independence. For
the empirical analysis, I rely on the most recently updated measure on legal
central bank independence from Bodea and Hicks (2015), which follows the
Cukierman et al. (1992) classification.7 To control for the effects of the
political system, I use a variable separating between parliamentary, assembly-
elected president, and presidential systems (Keefer 2012). Busch (1994)
argues that governments in presidential systems are reluctant to cede powers
to central banks. According to this hypothesis, IT adoptions should be more
likely in parliamentary systems.
In addition, one might expect that countries under IMF arrangements are
more likely to introduce IT. To account for that effect, I coded the sum of all
IMF program dummies provided by Dreher (2006). Finally, I also account for
a series of financial and economic indicators. First, I model foreign direct
investment (FDI) in % of the gross domestic product (GDP) as a control
6Source: Ilzetzki, Ethan, Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010), Exchange Rate Arrangements Entering
the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold? See Appendix A6 for the analysis of a classification in three regime
types based on this index.
7One of the elements of this index is the extent to which a central bank mandate prioritizes price stability as its
main policy objective. I exclude this item because of its obvious overlap with the dependent variable. Instead,
I use only the items that code whether a central bank is independent in the formulation (not the execution) of
monetary policy, in the appointment and dismissal of the heads of the central bank, and in its lending to the
government.
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variable. The adoption of IT signals to the international community that
a country follows modern economic practice. This may be more valuable, the
more a country’s economy depends on foreign investment. Accordingly,
countries with a higher share of FDI may be more likely to introduce IT
(Polillo and Guillén 2005). Second, the share of exports should, if anything,
be negatively correlated with the likelihood of IT adoption, as export-
dependent countries are more focused on the exchange rate. Third, GDP
per capita is expected to be positively correlated with the introduction of IT.
Fourth, higher capital control restrictions on cross-border transactions
should be associated with a lower likelihood of IT adoption (Chinn and Ito
2006).8
Appendix A4 reports results for models, including also government orien-
tation and the rolling averages of inflation. Governments on the right may be
more likely to introduce IT (Singer and Mukherjee 2008), and a period of
high inflation may increase the likelihood of IT adoption. The following
main models do not include these variables because of a low coverage in the
sample, but the reported main findings are robust to the inclusion of these
variables.
Empirical Findings
Table 1 presents the empirical results. Model 1 includes all main variables
and Models 2 and 3 add the interaction terms. As expected by hypothesis H1,
the polity variable is a positive and significant predictor of IT adoption: the
more institutionalized a democracy is, the more likely it is that IT will be
introduced. This finding supports the argument that an institutionalized
democratic system provides the conducive institutional context for the adop-
tion of IT. Model 2 includes the interaction of the polity score with the time
variable t. The significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term
shows that the explanatory power of the democracy score decreases over
time, which provides support for hypothesis H2.
Figure 2 plots the decreasing marginal effect of the polity score over time. As
hypothesized by H2, the effect that fully institutionalized democracies were more
likely to adopt IT was strong during the first stage of diffusion in the 1990s. After
the year 2003, the effect fades away. This finding supports the argument that the fit
of a new policy with the existing regime type is a particularly powerful predictor of
policy adoption in the first stage of global diffusion.
Turning to the alternative explanations and control variables, the positive
and significant predictor of the exchange-rate classification index in all
models of Table 1 lends support to the argument that the adoption of IT is
more likely when a currency is not pegged and when a central bank has to
8All economic variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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Table 1. Estimates of IT adoption logit models (standard errors in parentheses) with interac-
tion terms analyzing the conditional effects of the polity score (Model 2) and the flexibility of
IT in nearby countries (Model 3).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
INTERCEPT  11:26  25:05  19:28
ð2:54Þ ð6:06Þ ð4:03Þ
POLITY 0:42 1:84 1:25
ð0:16Þ ð0:59Þ ð0:36Þ
EXCHANGE RATE CLASSIFICATION 0:20 0:23 0:23
ð0:07Þ ð0:07Þ ð0:07Þ
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 0:62 0:45 0:52
ð1:09Þ ð1:10Þ ð1:09Þ
POLITICAL SYSTEM 0:06  0:01 0:01
ð0:23Þ ð0:24Þ ð0:24Þ
FDI (% OF GDP) 0:10 0:12 0:13
ð0:06Þ ð0:06Þ ð0:06Þ
EXPORTS (% OF GDP)  0:01  0:01  0:02
ð0:02Þ ð0:02Þ ð0:02Þ
GDP PER CAPITA  1:28  1:50  1:14
ð2:12Þ ð2:24Þ ð2:17Þ
IMF Conditionality  0:88  0:86  0:84
ð0:74Þ ð0:75Þ ð0:76Þ
Capital Controls  0:67  0:94  0:94
ð0:73Þ ð0:73Þ ð0:73Þ
IT FLEXIBILITY IN NEARBY COUNTRIES  0:14  0:30 5:63
(SPATIAL LAG) ð0:65Þ ð0:66Þ ð1:83Þ
POLITY  t  0:09
ð0:03Þ
IT FLEXIBILITY (SPATIAL LAG)  POLITY  0:71
ð0:21Þ
t 0:28 1:13 0:26
ð0:48Þ ð0:54Þ ð0:50Þ
t2 0:07 0:12 0:21
ð0:41Þ ð0:42Þ ð0:43Þ
t3  0:07  0:10  0:11
ð0:11Þ ð0:11Þ ð0:11Þ
AIC 262.18 256.05 254.10
BIC 333.57 332.54 330.59
N 1211 1211 1211
p< 0:01, p< 0:05, p< 0:1.
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of the polity score on the probability of IT adoption with 95%
confidence intervals over time, based on the estimates of Model 2 (see Table 1).
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give up a fixed exchange-rate regime because of pressure from the financial
markets. Appendix A6 shows results for a model, where the exchange-rate
index is reduced to three regime category variables that are modeled as
dummies (fixed, intermediary, and freely floating exchange rate regimes).
The results show again that countries with intermediary regimes and freely
floating exchange rates are more likely to introduce IT than countries with
a fixed exchange rate, but the effects are not significant in this alternative
specification.
Central bank independence and the political system are not systematically
correlated with IT adoption. Also, parliamentary democracies are not more
likely to introduce IT as compared to countries with presidential systems.
GDP per capita, export dependence, capital controls, and IMF conditionality
are neither systematically correlated with the introduction of IT. Only the
share of FDI is a positive (and weakly significant) predictor of IT introduc-
tion, which suggests that countries with a high share of FDI are more likely
to introduce IT. However, this effect is not robust in other model specifica-
tion, while in some models the negative effect of the capital control index on
the introduction of IT is statistically significant (see Appendix A4).
According to the estimates reported in Model 1 of Table 1, there is no average
effect of policy change in nearby countries for all countries in the sample, suggest-
ing that there is no diffusion effect, which is consistent with the analysis of Singer
and Mukherjee (2008). However, the main argument of this article is that spatial
diffusion is conditional (see H3).Model 3 of Table 1 includes the interaction of the
IT flexibility spatial lagwith the polity score to evaluate hypothesisH3,which states
that decision makers from less-democratic countries become more likely to adopt
IT when nearby countries increase the flexibility of the policy. The positive and
significant coefficient of the IT flexibility spatial lag together with the negative and
significant coefficient of the interaction term suggest that examples ofmore flexible
IT frameworks in nearby countries indeed have a positive effect on the likelihood
of adoption for less-established democracies. This result supports the main
hypothesis H3 of this analysis that policy change in nearby countries is an
important predictor of IT adoptions in countries with less-conducive institutional
regimes.
Figure 3 plots the marginal effects of IT flexibility in nearby countries for
the polity scores from 0 to 10 with 95% confidence intervals. The effect is
positive and statistically significant for about 1 out of 5 observations in the
analysis (19% of the observations in the sample have a polity score of 5 or
less, and 29% have a score of 6 or less). An illustrative case in point is
Armenia, in which the president has maintained extensive powers that are
only very weakly checked (the polity score of Armenia is over the investi-
gated time period 4.18). Shortly before Armenia adopted IT in 2005, Turkey
and Romania, which are both located close to Armenia, changed their IT
policies to more flexible frameworks with ranges from 6 to 8 and 6.5% to
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8.5%. The empirical evidence thus suggests that this increased policy flex-
ibility in nearby countries contributed to the adoption of IT by Armenia.
Moving from low to higher polity scores, the positive marginal effect
decreases and eventually fades away for high polity scores. Figure 3 also
shows that the effect almost turns negative for fully institutionalized democ-
racies with a polity score of 10. This may suggest that increasing the
flexibility of a policy decreases the attractiveness of adoption for countries
that have a conducive institutional regime for its original version.
Conclusion
The motivating question of this study is why very distinct countries adopt the
same policy. This puzzle applies to any global diffusion process because, by
definition, a policy that has spread globally has been adopted by a very
heterogenous group of countries. The findings of this analysis show that
early adopters are countries whose existing institutions are consistent with
the general idea behind a policy framework. In the case of the IT framework,
fully institutionalized democracies provide a conducive institutional regime
for early adoptions (Broz 2002).
This argument, however, does not explain why countries that are less
established democracies also adopted IT. Several economists argue that less
developed countries that are not fully institutionalized democracies do not
meet the macroeconomic and institutional prerequisites for IT (Eichengreen
et al. 1999; Epstein et al. 2009). However, the advocacy for IT by the IMF and
prominent academics strengthen political actors that want to prioritize
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Figure 3. Top plot: marginal effect of IT flexibility in nearby countries on the probability of IT
adoption with 95% confidence intervals for polity scores from 0 to 10, based on the estimates of
Model 3 (see Table 1). Bottom plot: density of polity score in the sample.
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inflation control in monetary policymaking. According to the main argument
developed in this article, policymakers of countries whose existing institu-
tions are not consistent with the original version of a policy have the
incentive to adopt a policy that has established a reputation as best practice,
but they adopt the policy only when they observe that nearby countries
adjust the policy to a more flexible framework. Through this mechanism,
the policy spreads beyond the institutional environment for which it was
developed. The findings of the empirical analyses on the global diffusion of
IT support this hypothesis.
In the final stage of a diffusion process, the rate of additional adoptions goes
down. In the case of IT, this fading away started around the financial crisis of 2008.
Since then, some of the conventional thinking in central banking has been
questioned. Central bankers in the developed world started to use so-called non-
conventional measures to stabilize financial markets and to boost economic
activity, while developing countries have reintroduced policies to stabilize the
exchange rate and restrict international capital movements. Against this backdrop,
there is an ongoing discussion among monetary economists about whether the
original framework of IT has become obsolete or should be adapted (Eichengreen,
El-Erian, Fraga, Ito, Pisani-Ferry, Prasad, Rajan, Ramos, Reinhart, Rey, Rodrik,
Rogoff, Song Shin, Velasco,Weder di Mauro, and Yu 2011). The more general
implication of this fading away for the study of global policy diffusion may be that
the flexibility of a policy is a powerful dissemination strategy, but with limits. The
policy loses its genuine attraction when the increased flexibility of a policy under-
mines the general idea of its original framework.
The abundant and growing scholarship on policy diffusion analyzes the
interaction between domestic and international politics, often either focusing
on the (quantitative) study of how structural connectives shape diffusion or
the (qualitative) investigation of how international and domestic actors
connect the two spheres (Chaudoin et al. 2015; Dobbin et al. 2007; Farrell
and Newman 2016). This article puts the content of the policy front and
center. This level of analysis has recently gained some attention in political
science (Beissinger 2007; Genovese et al. 2017), but is much more prominent
in other disciplines, such as history and sociology, where diffusion studies
provide rich qualitative insights on how international and domestic actors
adapt diffusing policies to the domestic context (Chorev 2012; Howlett et al.
2011). This article seeks to show how the focus on the changing content of
a policy is powerful to understand global diffusion dynamics. To that end,
this study takes a broader macro perspective, showing how external influ-
ences, domestic institutions, and the changing content of a policy interact in
global diffusion processes.
Finally, the focus of this article on how policies change is not only
important for our broader understanding of global diffusion but also for
assessing policy implications. The practical effects of more flexible and
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adapted policy frameworks depend on the motivation of policymakers. When
the adaptation of a policy is carefully tailored to specific social, political, and
economic challenges, the effects may be positive. However, decision makers
may also change policies precisely because they want to undermine the
effectiveness of a policy, as they are mainly interested in symbolic imitation.
Also, to address global challenges, increased policy flexibility may be proble-
matic, because multiple versions of the same policy framework can compli-
cate global governance if some consistency in the implementation is required
for international cooperation. This is the case, for example, in the fields of
climate change, health, or human rights. Therefore, the increased flexibility
of a policy framework can lead to dysfunctional policies and ineffective global
governance.
Acknowledgments
The bulk of this research was conducted while I was a Fung Global Fellow at Princeton
University. I thank my Fung colleagues – Seva Gunitsky, Alexandra Kowalski, Deepak
Malgham, Lorena Poblete, Aashish Velklar, and the academic director, Andreas Wimmer –
for inspiring discussions that have shaped the arguments of this article. I also wish to
acknowledge the insightful comments that I received from Alan Blinder, Don Brash, Mark
Beissinger, Markus Brunnermeier, Barbara Fritz, Fabrizio Gilardi, Peter Hall, Raymond
Hicks, Harold James, Aya Kachi, Liam McGrath, Dani Rodrik, Bernd Schlipphak, David
Andrew Singer, Gabi Spilker, and Yuri Zhukov, as well as the excellent research assistance
from Susanne Rhein.
References
Batini, Nicoletta, and Douglas Laxton. (2007) Under What Conditions Can Inflation
Targeting Be Adopted? The Experience Of Emerging Markets. In Monetary Policy under
Inflation Targeting, edited by K. Schmidt-Hebbel and F. Mishkin. Santiago: Central Bank
of Chile, pp. 467–506.
Batini, Nicoletta, Peter Breuer, Kalpana Kochhar, and Scott Roger. (2006) Inflation Targeting
and the IMF. Prepared by the IMF Monetary and Financial Systems, Policy and
Development, and Research Departments. Washington, DC: IMF.
Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. (2007) Intergovernmental Organizations,
Socialization, And Member-State Interest Convergence. International Organization, 61
(4):703–733. doi:10.1017/S0020818307070245
Beissinger, Mark R. (2007) Structure And Example In Modular Political Phenomena: The
Diffusion Of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics, 5
(2):259–276. doi:10.1017/S1537592707070776
Bernanke, Ben S., and Frederic S. Mishkin. (1997) Inflation Targeting: A New Framework
for Monetary Policy? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2):97–116. doi:10.1257/
jep.11.2.97
Bernanke, Ben S., Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Adam S. Posen. (1999) Inflation
Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.
634 F. WASSERFALLEN
Bernauer, Thomas, Anna Kalbhenn, Koubi Vally, and Gabriele Spilker. (2010) A Comparison
of International and Domestic Sources of Global Governance Dynamics. British Journal of
Political Science, 40(3):509–538. doi:10.1017/S0007123410000098
Besley, Timothy, and Marta Reynal-Querol. (2011) Do Democracies Select More Educated
Leaders? American Political Science Review, 105(3):552–566. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000281
Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. (2015) International Finance and Central Bank
Independence: Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital. The Journal of
Politics, 77(1):268–284. doi:10.1086/678987
Brooks, Sarah M. (2007) When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural
Pension Reforms across Nations. The Journal of Politics, 69(3):701–715. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2508.2007.00569.x
Brooks, Sarah M., and Marcus J. Kurtz. (2012) Paths to Financial Policy Diffusion: Statist
Legacies in Latin America’s Globalization. International Organization, 66(1):95–128.
doi:10.1017/S0020818311000385
Broz, Lawrence J. (2002) Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes.
International Organization, 56(4):861–887. doi:10.1162/002081802760403801
Broz, Lawrence J., and Jeffry A. Frieden. (2006) The Political Economy of Exchange Rates. In
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by B. R. Weingast and D. A. Wittman.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 587–597.
Busch, Andreas. (1994) Central Bank Independence and the Westminster Model. West
European Politics, 17(1):53–72. doi:10.1080/01402389408425001
Calvo, Guillermo A. (1978) On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary
Economy. Econometrica, 46(6):1411–1428. doi:10.2307/1913836
Cao, Xun. (2012) Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: A Network
Explanation of Policy Changes. World Politics, 64(3):375–425. doi:10.1017/
S0043887112000081
Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. (2010) Back to the Future: Modeling Time
Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis, 18(3):271–292. doi:10.1093/pan/mpq013
Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. (2015) International Systems and
Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International
Relations. International Organization, 69(2):275–309. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000356
Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. (2006) What Matters for Financial Development? Capital
Controls, Institutions, and Interactions. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1):163–192.
doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.05.010
Chorev, Nitsan. (2012) Changing Global Norms through Reactive Diffusion: The Case of
Intellectual Property Protection of AIDS Drugs. American Sociological Review, 77
(5):831–853. doi:10.1177/0003122412457156
Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb, and Bilin Neyapti. (1992) Measuring the Independence of
Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6
(3):353–398. doi:10.1093/wber/6.3.353
Dobbin, Frank, Beth A. Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett. (2007) The Global Diffusion of
Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning? Annual Review
of Sociology 33:449–472. 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.090106.142507.
Dreher, Axel. (2006) IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and
Compliance with Conditionality. World Development, 34(5):769–788. doi:10.1016/j.
worlddev.2005.11.002
Eichengreen, Barry, Mohamed El-Erian, Arminio Fraga, Takatoshi Ito, Jean Pisani-Ferry,
Eswar Prasad, Raghuram Rajan, Markus Brunnermeier, José De Gregorio, Philip R. Arminio
Fraga, Maria Ramos Lane, Hélène Rey, Dani Rodrik, Kenneth Rogoff, Hyun Song,
INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 635
Shin Andrés, Velasco Beatrice, Weder Di Mauro, and Yongding Yu. (2011) Rethinking Central
Banking. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Eichengreen, Barry, Paul Masson, Miguel Savaston, and Sunil Sharma. (1999) Transition
Strategies And Nomina Anchors On The Road To Greater Exchange-Rate Flexibility.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Epstein, Gerald A., and Erinc Yeldan, eds. (2009) Beyond Inflation Targeting: Assessing the
Impacts and Policy Alternatives. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. (2016) The New Interdependence Approach:
Theoretical Development and Empirical Demonstration. Review of International Political
Economy 23(5):713–736.
Filardo, Andrew, and Hans Gensberg. (2010) Targeting Inflation in Asia and the Pacific:
Lessons from the Recent Past. In Twenty Years of Inflation Targeting: Lessons Learned and
Future Prospects, edited by D. Cobham, O. Eitrheim, S. Gerlach, J. F. Qvigstad, and
MA Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, pp. 144–171.
Fraga, Arminio, Ilan Goldfain, and André Minella. (2003) Inflation Targeting in Emerging
Market Economies. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 18:365–400.
Genovese, Frederica, Florian G. Kern, and Christian Martin. (2017) Policy Alteration:
Rethinking Diffusion Processes When Policies Have Alternatives. International Studies
Quarterly 61(2):236–252.
Howlett, Peter, and Mary S. Morgan, eds. (2011) How Well Do Facts Travel? New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Keefer, Philip. (2012) Database of Political Institutions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
King, Michael. (2005) Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas: Central Bank
Reform in the United Kingdom. West European Politics 28(1):94–123.
Klingler-Vidra, Robyn, and Philip Schleifer. (2014) Convergence More or Less: Why Do
Practices Vary as They Diffuse? International Studies Review 16(2):264–274.
McNamara, Kathleen R. (1999) The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European
Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
McNamara, Kathleen. (2002) Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social
Logic of Delegation. West European Politics 25(1):47–76.
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. (1977) Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83(2):340–363.
Neumayer, Eric, and Plüumper. Thomas. (2012) Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence:
Theory and Model Specification. Comparative Political Studies 45(7):819–849.
Polillo, Simone, and Mauro F. Guillén. (2005) Globalization Pressures and the State: The
Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence. American Journal of Sociology 110
(6):1764–1802.
Radaelli, Claudio M. (2005) Diffusion without Convergence: How Political Context Shapes
the Adoption Regulatory Impact Assessment. Journal of European Public Policy 12
(5):924–943.
Reichlin, Lucrezia, and Richard Baldwin. (2013) Is Inflation Targeting Dead? Central Banking
after the Crisis. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Scheve, Kenneth. (2004) Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of
Macroeconomic Policymaking. International Organization 58(1):1–34.
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. (2008) The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion. American
Journal of Political Science 52(4):840–857.
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. (2014) When the Smoke Clears: Expertise, Learning
and Policy Diffusion. Journal of Public Policy 34(3):357–387.
Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, eds. (2008) The Global Diffusion of
Markets and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
636 F. WASSERFALLEN
Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. (2004) The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy
Diffusion in the International Political Economy. Ammerican Political Science Review 98
(1):17–189.
Singer, David Andrew, and Bumba Mukherjee. (2008) Monetary Institutions, Partisanship,
and Inflation Targeting. International Organization 62(2):323–358.
Svensson, Lars E. O. (2010) Inflation Targeting. NBER Working Paper No. 16654: 1–76.
Thomassen, Eivind. (2017) Translating Central Bank Independence into Norwegian: Central
Bankers and the Diffusion of Central Bank Independence to Norway in the 1990s. Review
of International Political Economy 24(5):839–858.
Wiener, Antje. (2007) The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State:
Sociological and Normative Approaches to Interaction. Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy 10(1):47–69.
Winston, Carla. (2018) Norm Structure, Diffusion, and Evolution: A Conceptual Approach.
European Journal of International Relations 24(3):638–661.
Woodford, Michael. (2003) Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 637
